When the rebellion in Sudan’s Darfur region began in 2003, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir relied on local armed Arab groups, known as the Janjaweed, to suppress it. This decision ultimately led to his downfall as the Janjaweed, along with the Sudanese army, committed war crimes against the Darfuris, resulting in an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court. In an attempt to ensure the stability of his regime, al-Bashir legalized the Janjaweed militia and promoted one of its commanders, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, to the head of the newly renamed Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This move, however, only fragmented the military sector and ultimately led to al-Bashir’s resignation in 2019. The RSF, under Hemedti’s leadership, carried out a coup against the provisional civilian government and sparked a conflict with the Sudanese army. The country is now facing a devastating humanitarian crisis with thousands of casualties and millions of people displaced.
Similarly, Russian President Vladimir Putin also turned to mercenaries in his pursuit of power consolidation. In response to the rebellion in Ukraine, Putin annexed Crimea and created a mercenary force called Wagner to invade the eastern part of the country. Wagner proved to be an effective tool for Putin’s foreign policy adventures, but tensions between Wagner and the Russian military leadership eventually led to a deadly mutiny in 2024. This event exposed Putin’s weak leadership and shook the regime’s foundation.
These examples demonstrate the dangers of relying on mercenaries for power consolidation. Both al-Bashir and Putin underestimated the risks involved and ultimately lost control over military and security structures. Leaders should take heed of these cautionary tales and avoid outsourcing government responsibilities to violent collaborators. Private militias only lead to self-destruction.