If China truly wishes to decouple Europe from the US, it will have to persuade Europeans that it can provide better protection against Russia than Washington can.
That is clearly a tall order. But if China could rein in hostile Russian behaviour towards Europe, Europeans would highly value their relationship with China.
China could, for example, call for an immediate ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine war, the withdrawal of all Russian forces from internationally recognised Ukrainian territory and the end of all Chinese trade with Russia until these steps are completed.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, of course, would be utterly livid at any such announcement. If China halted all trade with Russia, Moscow’s war effort would be much harder. And if Russia became isolated from China as well as the West, Putin’s effort to fund his war via foreign trade would be far more difficult.
Without China’s demand, the price Moscow could get for its petroleum might drop even further than it has under Western sanctions. And without China’s provision of dual-use items, necessary components for its weapons would dry up. Moscow might hope to still receive arms from Iran and North Korea, but even these two might not be willing to continue in the face of Chinese opposition.
By contrast, Ukraine, the rest of Europe and even the US would be delighted just by the announcement of a Chinese call for an end to Putin’s war effort and a Russian force withdrawal, leave alone Russia heeding it.
Moscow’s compliance would not by itself bring about an end to the Nato alliance. But if Russia’s aggressive behaviour came to an end, then over time Europeans would return to their proclivity for spending less on defence. Most importantly, Europeans might come to see good relations with China as being more important to containing Russia than good relations with the US, especially a US potentially led by a Donald Trump who questions the US’ commitment to Nato.
There is, of course, no guarantee that a halt to Chinese trade with Russia would eventually lead to Europe being more oriented towards China than the US. And Beijing would be loath to turn against Moscow, its oft-declared strategic partner.
It should be noted, though, that Putin has no hesitation in cozying up to states like India and Vietnam which cooperate in the security realm with the US. Putin has never been shy about pursuing Russian great power interests when he sees them as being different from China’s. There is no reason, then, for China not to pursue its great power interests when they differ from Russia’s.
There is no doubt China has become a great power. But what kind of great power does its leadership want China to be? Is it an insecure, defensive great power that sticks with what anti-Western partners it now has, such as Russia, whose behaviour frightens Europeans and others into increased reliance on the US? Or is it a more self-confident one prepared to sacrifice the interests of its problematic allies to gain even more allies or at least weaken their alliances with the US?
As an American concerned about continued US influence in the world, I would prefer that China remain supportive of Putin since this leads Europe to fear Beijing as Moscow’s ally, and so remain loyal to Washington. But is this in China’s best interests?
Mark N. Katz is professor emeritus of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, a global fellow at the Wilson Center, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council
